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1. Introduction 
Outbound foreign direct investments (FDI) by multinational corporations play a vital role in the 
world economy. According to the 2016 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2016), a strong FDI 
rally occurred in 2015. Global FDI increased by 38% to $1.8 trillion, a record high since the 2008 
financial crisis. The surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) is the principal 
contributor to the recovery of FDI. The value of cross-border deals soared to $721 billion in 2015, 
almost double the amount in 2014 ($432 billion).  
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched its “go global” initiative in 2001, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) became increasingly active in the world. In fact, the outbound FDI 
of Chinese SOEs increased more than threefold between 2009 and 2015 to $128 billion. This helped 
China become the world’s third largest foreign investor after the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, China 
is the only developing economy among the top ten foreign investors. In contrast to other major 
developing economies whose outbound FDIs typically take the form of reinvested earnings, 
China’s FDI mainly consists of new equity investments (UNCTAD, 2016).  
In 2006, the Chinese government also incorporated privately owned enterprises (POEs) in its go 
global strategy by starting to offer tax rebates and access to long-term financing at favorable terms 
to POEs (Cheng and Ma, 2010). Despite these efforts, however, there is (anecdotal) evidence that 
POEs continue to face severe limitations when conducting overseas investments today.  
According to Cheng and Ma (2010), the Chinese government may have technically lifted many 
of the restrictions for POEs, but adequate assistance remains out of reach for several reasons. Some 
POEs find the approval procedure for going global to be tedious and overly time-consuming. To 
address this problem, Cheng and Ma suggest that a “one-stop-shop” approach to obtaining 
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approvals would be more efficient. In addition, many POEs feel that they are at a serious 
disadvantage when attempting to obtain credit for international business transactions because the 
quotas for long-term loans are allocated exclusively to SOEs (Poncet, Steingress, and 
Vandenbussche, 2010; Guariglia, Liu, and Song, 2011).1  Furthermore, most of the major Chinese 
commercial banks are owned and controlled by the Chinese government and their primary function 
is to support SOEs’ economic activities (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008). These banks tend to 
screen out POEs from their lending activities because they are considered high risk. Consequently, 
many Chinese POEs must turn to other sources, from employing their own capital (Liu and Tan, 
2004) to raising capital overseas (Sutherland and Ning, 2011), or even allying with private equity 
(Financial Times, 2012).  
Despite the ongoing restrictions faced by Chinese POEs, they have been challenging the 
dominance of SOEs in the area of cross-border acquisitions in recent years. As China Daily (2016) 
reports, in September 2016, China’s privately-owned enterprises (POEs) overtook SOEs for the 
first time in outbound FDI. Specifically, POEs now lead in terms of both value and number of 
cross-border M&A transactions, accounting for 65.3% of all deals. This development seems 
puzzling, given that the Chinese government has traditionally favoured SOEs for which it could 
effectively exercise its control rights. This raises the following question: Why have the cross-border 
investments of SOEs slowed down and how did POEs come to replace SOEs as the leaders of 
Chinese cross-border deals? 
Some recent examples of SOEs experiencing setbacks in the global M&A market illustrate the 
                                                             
1 There are three policy banks in China coordinating government-directed spending: The Agricultural Development 
Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China. They were established in 1994 
and are responsible for financing economic and trade development as well as state-controlled projects. 
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potential reasons for the recent dominance of Chinese POEs in cross-border acquisitions. First, 
Tsinghua Unigroup, an SOE, attempted to acquire West Digital Corporation (a data storage group 
in the U.S.) in 2015. However, Tsinghua withdrew the $3.8 billion offer after the deal was flagged 
for investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (see 
Financial Times, 2016). Similarly, the CFIUS challenged Philips’ attempt to sell its lighting 
business to a Chinese consortium. Similar interventions have also occurred in other countries. In 
Germany, for example, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy withdrew its clearance 
certificate for the takeover of Aixtron, a semiconductor producer, by Fujian Grand Chip Investment 
Group (a Chinese state-owned bidder), indicating Berlin’s reluctance to transfer Aixtron’s cutting-
edge technology and revealing security-related technologies through the acquisition (see New York 
Times, 2016). President Obama even issued an executive order prohibiting the acquisition of 
Aixtron’s U.S.-based business. Presumably in response to the previously described case, as well as 
similar cases that took place around the same time in Germany, the German government initiated 
a regulation review at the EU-level for takeovers by investors from outside the EU and proposed 
the following changes: a) doubling the time for reviewing takeovers, b) restricting indirect 
takeovers, and c) re-defining a “threat to public order” to include a diverse array of new sectors 
that are considered critical (see The Telegraph, 2017).  
These events clearly suggest increasing headwinds for Chinese SEOs that wish to complete 
cross-border acquisitions, as foreign governments fear the indirect transfer of cutting-edge 
technology or the loss of ownership of businesses with national security or strategic importance to 
Chinese government-controlled firms. Similar trends are identified by Linklaters (2017) who notes 
that in 2016, up to one-third of Chinese outbound M&A deals were blocked by the host 
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governments – the vast majority of these deals involving Chinese SOEs. For POEs, ties to the 
Chinese government are less direct and support is offered in the form of tax rebates as well as 
subsidies and favorable financing terms if the firm completes the cross-border acquisition. This is 
neatly summarized by a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) who suggests that “Given the fact that SOEs often experience setbacks when acquiring 
foreign companies in advanced economies, POEs are encouraged to acquire the high technology 
for the growth of China’s economy. Because POEs rarely have Chinese government background, 
they can avoid the scrutiny from foreign governments targeting Chinese SOEs. The government 
should provide financing to POEs for their cross-border deals and even state-owned companies 
could provide funding in the background to POEs” (see Sina Finance, 2010). 
The above analysis suggests that using politically (well-) connected POEs as government agents 
appears to be the best solution because politically connected top managers tend to actively respond 
to the government’s suggestion to proceed with cross-border acquisitions and are better equipped 
to overcome market discrimination against POEs with regard to, for example, securing sufficient 
long-term financing from state-owned commercial banks (see Li et al., 2008). However, the fact 
that politically connected POEs have the incentives and means to carry out cross-border 
acquisitions does not necessarily imply that these acquisitions constitute sound business practice 
nor that they will be financially successful. This somewhat contradictory state of affairs is a key 
theme of the current paper and is illustrated by the following examples. The Anbang Insurance 
Group, a Chinese POE whose CEO and chairman has working experience in a governmental 
department (the Administration for Industry and Commerce), was aggressively bidding for 
Starwood. This raised concerns that the acquisition was motivated not entirely by commercial 
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interests, but also by political ones, including the desire to acquire technology and expertise in 
strategic sectors (see Bloomberg, 2016). Similarly, in mid-2017, Hytera Communications, a 
Chinese POE telecom giant, successfully acquired Norsat, a Vancouver-based Canadian satellite 
communications company, thereby gaining access to “sensitive Western satellite technology.” This 
deal was heavily criticized because of the chairman’s close ties to the Chinese Ministry of Public 
Security, which oversees China’s security agencies. In response to the acquisition, the U.S Defense 
Department initiated a review of all existing contracts with Norsat because the same satellite 
communications technology would presumably now also be used by the Chinese (see The Globe 
and Mail, 2017). These examples suggest that one of the primary motivations for cross-border 
acquisitions by Chinese POEs is strategic asset seeking (see Deng, 2009; Huang and Chi, 2014).  
Further evidence of the fact that cross-border acquisitions completed by politically connected 
POEs may not be motivated purely by commercial interests comes from a report by the Ministry 
of Commerce of China, which revealed that only 13% of the cross-border deals made by Chinese 
companies are profitable (see Sina Finance, 2016). As mentioned above, a possible explanation is 
that politically connected top management of POEs aims to acquire strategic assets largely for 
political motives, trying to complete the acquisition at all costs and thereby sometimes overpaying. 
This behaviour was clearly evident in the previously described case of Anbang Insurance Group 
which started a bidding competition for Starwood and ended up in a high-risk financial model (see 
Bloomberg, 2016). According to analysts, Landbridge Group, a Chinese privately-owned company, 
recently bought the Australian port of Darwin for more than twice its true value (see ABC, 2015). 
Another example of politically connected top management attempting to “flatter” the government 
by blindly following its recommendations is the recent trend for Chinese firms to buy foreign 
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football clubs. They rush into these deals not because they are particularly good investments, but 
because President Xi Jinping has expressed hopes that China will become a soccer powerhouse 
(see South China Morning Post, 2017).  
A further possible explanation for the failure of outbound investments is that after deal 
completion, Chinese POEs often find that competition in the host country is much tougher and that 
some business practices commonly accepted in China, such as relaxing health and safety standards, 
cannot be mirrored abroad (see Bloomberg, 2017). A similar argument was also invoked by 
Antkiewicz and Whalley (2006) in discussing why most of the cross-border M&A transactions 
attempted by Chinese SOEs are unsuccessful in Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.  
We use the term political connection trade-off theory to refer to the oppositional situation 
whereby politically connected POEs are better positioned (than their unconnected counterparts) to 
manage the necessary logistics of a cross-border M&A, but the deals often come at the cost of poor 
financial performance. If productivity and profitability were frequently to matter less than political 
goals, politically connected POEs would subject themselves to moral hazard and create a 
“principal-principal” conflict between the state and the firm’s shareholders (see Young et al., 2008)2.  
Specifically, the “political empire building” behavior of politically connected top managers would 
have a negative effect on shareholders’ wealth.  
To test the political connection trade-off theory, i.e. that politically connected top managers of 
POEs are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A transaction than their unconnected 
                                                             
2 The hypothesized principal-principal problem conflict leans on the well documented principal-agent problem. For 
Chinese POEs with politically connected managers, it describes the behavior of politically active managers who pursue 
state interests and their own political careers at the detriment of the firm’s shareholders. 
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counterparts, but at the cost of poorer performance, we conduct several analyses. First, based on a 
sample of 1,782 Chinese POEs listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we 
analyze the POEs’ likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A deal. Consistent with our 
argumentation, we find that politically connected POEs have a greater likelihood of successfully 
completing a cross-border merger or acquisition than their unconnected counterparts. Our results 
remain robust after invoking a variety of robustness checks. 
In a second set of analyses, we examine stock price returns and the return on equity after the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A to test for the market reaction and the impact on firm 
performance. We expect both the short- and long-term post-M&A performance to be lower for 
politically connected POEs than for non-politically connected POEs. We show that this is indeed 
the case; POEs with a politically connected chairman or CEO show significantly lower 
announcement returns (to the tune of about 1.5 to 2 percent) and are less profitable than their non-
connected counterparts within the first three years after deal completion.  
Overall, our study supports the political connection trade-off theory and makes the following 
contributions to the existing literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
deliver a theoretical framework and empirical analysis of how political connections influence a 
Chinese POE’s decision to engage in cross-border M&A activities and what the related costs of 
these connections are. Second, our study contributes to the literature on how governmental 
influence in emerging markets can affect the decisions of domestic firms to expand internationally 
through cross-border M&A deals (see Xiao and Sun, 2005; Rui and Yip, 2008; Peng, Wang, and 
Jiang, 2008; Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010; and Du and Boateng, 2015). Finally, our study contributes 
to the research methodology typically used in studies in this area.  
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The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses, while 
Section 3 describes the data collection process. Our research methodology is presented in Section 
4 and Section 5 provides our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Political Connections and Cross-border M&A Deals 
Political connections can be valuable to firms’ financing activities in both developed and 
developing countries, as many empirical studies have shown.3  However, the benefits are generally 
more pronounced in emerging markets because of their relatively inferior institutional 
environments, more concentrated ownership structures, and less efficient legal systems (La Porta 
et al., 1998, 2000). In the case of China, we argue that the political connections of top management 
team members are more beneficial for POEs than SOEs simply because Chinese POEs face a 
different institutional environment. SOEs in China are the pillars of the national economy, while 
POEs must seek ways to overcome the discrimination they face in the capital market. One method 
is to build political ties with the government by hiring top managers with specific political 
backgrounds (Chen et al., 2011). Positive influences of political connections on various economic 
activities of Chinese POEs are documented in many empirical studies. Li et al. (2008) find that 
POE founders are more likely to obtain financing from state-controlled institutions if they have 
political party membership. Politically connected Chinese firms are also more likely to obtain loans 
with longer terms and lower interest rates when borrowing from state-owned banks (see Luo and 
Zhen, 2008; Yu and Pan, 2008; and Yuan, Jing, and Liao, 2010). Luo and Liu (2009) note that it is 
                                                             
3 See, for example, Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Adhikari, Derashid, and Zhang (2006), 
Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006), Faccio (2006), Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008), 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), and Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016). 
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easier for politically connected POEs in China to enter industries with high entry barriers, such as 
banking and telecommunications. Similarly, Li and Zhou (2015) find that politically connected 
POEs are more likely to get IPO requests approved and that such POEs are less likely to be 
subjected to on-site auditing from regulatory authorities.  
Based on the arguments above, we expect that POEs whose top managers have political ties to 
the Chinese government are both more willing and more able to complete cross-border M&A 
transactions. Thus, we postulate Hypothesis 1 as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Politically connected POEs are more likely to complete cross-border M&A 
deals than unconnected POEs. 
2.2. Corporate Governance and Cross-border M&A Deals  
In the previous subsection, our argument for the value of political connections is based on the 
institutional environment of a POE’s home country. Nevertheless, when POEs enter the global 
market, they are also affected by the institutional environment of the host countries (see Kostova, 
1999; Lu et al., 2014; and Regner and Edman, 2014). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that when 
companies enter a foreign market, they are likely to adapt to the prevalent organizational practices 
and structures in the host country with the goal of enhancing their overall sense of legitimacy.  
This issue is more prominent when companies from emerging economies, with relatively poorer 
institutional environments, enter more advanced economies that typically feature higher-level 
institutional environments (as is mostly the case in the present study). Therefore, we expect that 
some Chinese POEs will endeavor to ameliorate their corporate governance to ensure that they 
meet local governance standards before attempting to conduct cross-border deals. This would give 
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them a greater chance of being successful. Therefore, in Hypothesis 2, we posit the following 
relationship between corporate governance and POEs’ cross-border deals: 
Hypothesis 2: POEs with better corporate governance are more likely to complete a cross-
border M&A deal.  
2.3. The Performance of Acquiring POEs 
It is commonly known that the Chinese government intervenes with SOEs’ business activities 
by appointing managers that have strong political ties. These politically connected managers can 
assist the government in achieving political and social objectives, which may be prioritized over 
commercial goals (see Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). By following the government’s recommendations, 
the managers can increase their political capital, which is vital to their political career. However, 
decision making based on a manager’s political agenda may come at the expense of shareholders’ 
wealth, creating a principal-principal conflict between the intervening government and non-state 
shareholders (see Young et al., 2008). This conjecture is supported by empirical analysis. For 
example, Wu, Wu, and Rui (2012) show that SOEs with politically connected top managers have 
lower accounting performance (measured by ROA) and fewer growth options (measured by 
Tobin’s q). Similarly, Fan et al. (2007) examine the performance of Chinese IPO firms using a 
sample of 790 partially privatized SOEs. Their empirical analysis shows that IPO firms whose CEO 
is politically connected to the Chinese government have lower initial returns and lower accounting 
performance in the three years after going public. They argue that the political rent seeking 
behavior of politically connected CEOs expropriates the wealth of minority shareholders, which in 
turn harms firm performance. Evidence of the principal-principal conflict is also found by Sun, 
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Vinig, and Hosman (2017) who show that SOEs have significantly lower stock performance around 
outbound M&A announcements than POEs, for which political connections are arguably less 
present. They reason that although SOEs enjoy patronage in obtaining bank loans with a lower cost 
of borrowing to finance their cross-border deals, this advantage is often misused in the sense that 
SOEs are more likely to invest in risky cross-border deals or to overpay for the target. 
Although the above evidence pertains to SOEs, we conjecture that if politically connected POEs 
are politically motivated to conduct cross-border M&A transactions (e.g. for political empire 
building), then instead of maximizing shareholder wealth, a similar principal-principal conflict may 
occur, resulting in adverse firm performance. In contrast, non-connected POEs, being unaffected 
by this conflict, are more likely to pursue a cross-border M&A for commercial reasons, which is 
in line with shareholder interests. Based on these arguments, we formulate Hypothesis 3 as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: Acquiring POEs with political connections have lower stock returns around 
the time of a cross-border M&A announcement and lower post-merger 
financial performance than non-politically connected POEs.  
3. Data 
3.1.  Financial and Corporate Governance Data 
We identify listed Chinese POEs by using the China Listed Private Enterprise Research 
Database, provided by China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR), which includes 
all Chinese POEs listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. In contrast to Chinese 
SOEs, POEs are defined as enterprises directly controlled by individuals, families, other non-state 
entities, or foreign enterprises. Financial data for the Chinese POEs in our sample comes from 
CSMAR’s China Stock Market Financial Statement Database and the corporate governance data 
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comes from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms’ Corporate Governance Research Database. We found 
that some POEs are missing information on corporate governance-related data. We therefore 
manually collect the missing data from the Stockstar website (www.stockstar.com), which provides 
detailed information about the top management of firms traded on both exchanges. Our sample 
begins in 2007 after the Chinese government issued a call for stronger financing support for POEs 
wishing to go global and ends in 2016. We winsorize all the financial data at the 1% and 99% levels 
to minimize the influence of potential outliers. Our final sample consists of 1,782 POEs and 9,946 
firm-year observations. 
3.2. Identification of Cross-border M&A Transactions by Chinese POEs 
We define a POE as acquisitive if a cross-border M&A deal was completed during the 
observation period. We obtain the cross-border deals of Chinese POEs from CSMAR’s China 
Listed Firms’ Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database. We exclude any 
cases where the cross-border M&A occurred in tax havens or offshore financial centers because 
firms acquired in this way are not “real” or “producing” foreign companies, but rather Chinese 
“shell companies.”4  
We find that 290 Chinese POEs completed 385 cross-border M&A deals between 2007 to 2016. 
We exclude two POEs that engaged in cross-border M&A activities before that time period, 
because these acquisitions might follow a different rationale. We consider the remaining 288 firms 
completing 385 cross-border M&A transactions as acquiring POEs (see Table 1). CSMAR’s China 
Listed Firms’ Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database also provides the 
                                                             
4 Our sample excludes the following tax havens and offshore financial centers: American Samoa, the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Mauritius, Panama, and Samoa. 
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country of origin of each overseas target that is acquired. In total, the cross-border deals completed 
by Chinese POEs span forty countries (see Table 2 for an overview).  
3.4.  Identification of Political Connections 
We proxy for political connections by following the recent literature by Faccio (2006), Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang (2007), Li and Zhou (2015), and Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016). The 
present study only considers the political background of the Chinese POE’s board chairman and 
CEO. We hand-collect the information for each company in our sample from Stockstar, which 
provides detailed past and current work experience for the top management of each listed company.  
We define a POE’s chairman or CEO as politically connected if he or she is or was a 
representative in the People’s Congress (PC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), an officer in local or central government, or an officer in the military. We 
code the political connection dummy variable (Connection) as 1 for each year since the chairman 
or CEO is politically connected, and 0 otherwise (see Li and Zhou, 2015; Schweizer, Walker, and 
Zhang, 2016). In addition, we measure the strength of the political connections of each firm’s 
chairman or CEO by creating a political connection index (PC Index). The value of this index 
ranges from 1 to 3 depending on the strength of the political ties (where 3 represents the strongest 
political connection).5  
                                                             
5 According to a research report by Harvard University’s Kennedy School, the PC, in conjunction with the CPPCC, 
act as the legislative arm of the government and thus as the highest political entity in China (see Saich, 2015). The 
PC’s functions include: overseeing the work of government departments and electing major officials; amending the 
constitution; supervising the enforcement of constitutional and legal enactments; and examining and approving the 
state budget and the economic plan. Members serving on the standing committee of the PC and CPPCC command 
particular power, as they work actively on law-making. In addition, Saich (2015) notes that the PC and CPPCC play 
more than a ceremonial role in China. Therefore, we assign the highest PC Index value of 3 to POEs in which the top 
managers are (or were) members of the standing committee of the PC and CPPCC, as well as to POEs whose top 
manager is the head of the central or provincial government. If the top managers of a POE are ordinary members of 
the PC or CPPCC, we assign a value of 2 to the PC Index. Finally, if the chairman or CEO is only an officer of a 
specific governmental department, or was an officer in the army, his or her political connections are considered more 
limited; hence, we assign a value of 1 to the PC Index. 
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3.5. Measuring Corporate Governance 
To examine the impact of corporate governance on Chinese POEs becoming acquisitive overseas, 
we construct a comprehensive index that measures the overall corporate governance level of 
Chinese POEs. Our index aims to reflect a company’s overall governance quality more accurately 
than single governance factors. It also eliminates multicollinearity that may arise in multivariate 
regressions when using single governance factors (Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven, 2011). The 
advantages of a corporate governance index have been elaborated upon quite extensively in the 
extant literature (see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Dutordoir, 
Strong, and Ziegan, 2014; and Shan, 2015).  
We follow Shan (2015) and construct an equally weighted corporate governance index for 
Chinese listed firms according to China’s two-tier board system, but modify where necessary to 
account for the fact that our sample includes only POEs and no SOEs. Thus, we exclude the factor 
differentiating SOEs and POEs. We also exclude a factor for cross-listings. 6  We obtain the 
corporate governance data from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms’ Corporate Governance Research 
Database and construct the final index (Gov Index) using nine equally weighted corporate 
governance factors. Detailed information on the construction of the index is provided in Panel B 
of Table A1 in the appendix. 
  
                                                             
6 In our sample, four POEs are cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Because Hong Kong is a self-governing 
special administrative region of the People's Republic of China, those four POEs cannot be considered real cross-listed 
firms. We also checked whether these POEs completed cross-border deals within our sample period and they did not. 
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3.6.  Measuring Financial Performance 
To examine how cross-border M&A deals affect a POE’s performance, we calculate short-term 
stock returns in response to the announcement of a cross-border M&A deal. We collect all stock 
returns for acquiring POEs and the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index from 
CSMAR’s China Stock Market Trading Database. To examine the accounting based performance 
of acquiring POEs, we measure each firm’s return on equity (ROE) three years after deal 
completion. 
3.7. Control Variables 
We include an array of control variables that could potentially affect the likelihood of a Chinese 
POE carrying out a cross-border deal: profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), firm size (Firm 
Size), growth opportunities (Tobin’s q), and a tangible asset ratio (Tangibility). We also use those 
variables to conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) technique. Detailed information for the 
control variables is provided in Panel A of Table A1 in the appendix.  
To study the market reaction to the cross-border announcement, we include the following deal 
characteristics: the cultural difference between China and the country in which the target firm is 
located (Hofstede and Culture Distance), a frequent acquirer dummy (Multi Acquirer), deal value 
(Deal Size), a public listed target dummy (Public Target), method of payment dummies (All Cash 
Deal and All Stock Deal), and a legal origin dummy (Common Law). We obtain deal specific 
characteristics from CSMAR’s Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1.  Political Connections and Cross-border M&A 
To examine how political connections can affect the likelihood of becoming an acquisitive POE, 
we carry out the following panel logit regressions which take account of the fact that some 
acquisitive POEs complete more than one cross-border M&A deal:  
𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴(1/0)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏,𝒕 +
𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                 (1) 
where 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 is a binary variable that equals 1 if Chinese POE i completes a cross-border deal in 
year t, and 0 otherwise; Political Connections are measured by either the independent variable 
Connection or PC Index; Gov Index captures the potential influence of overall corporate 
governance quality on the likelihood of completing a cross-border deal; 𝚴𝒏 is a vector of firm-
specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, Tangibility); 𝜑𝑘 are industry fixed 
effects7; and 𝜋𝑡 are year fixed effects. If political connections increase a Chinese POE’s likelihood 
of acquiring overseas targets, we expect the coefficients on Connection or the PC Index (𝛽1) to be 
positive. Similarly, if Chinese POEs with better corporate governance have a greater chance of 
entering the global market, we expect the coefficient on the Gov Index (𝛽2) to be positive.  
We next describe the robustness checks pertinent to this part of the study (i.e. the effect of 
political connections). Firstly, we describe the steps taken to address any concerns about a self-
selection bias, i.e. that politically connected top managers may not be randomly distributed across 
POEs. For example, larger and more profitable POEs may be more capable of building political 
connections by hiring a chairman or CEO with a political background. To overcome such a bias, 
                                                             
7 We use fifteen industry dummy variables based on CSMAR’s industry classifications. 
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we use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to study the pure effect of political 
connections on cross-border M&A activity. The treatment variable is cross-border M&A (CBMA). 
We use the nearest neighbor matching method to match acquiring firms in the year before 
completing a cross-border M&A with non-acquiring POEs on the vector of control variables (ROA, 
Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, Tangibility). This results in two subsamples: 1) 770 (= 385 
acquiring plus 385 control) firm-years when considering all cross-border M&A deals and 2) 576 
(= 288 acquiring plus 288 control) firm-years when only considering deals which were the first 
cross-border M&A transactions carried out by the POE in question. For each subsample, we re-run 
equation (1), but instead of a panel regression we use a cross sectional logistic regression.  
A further robustness check is carried out to examine whether political connections identified via 
a firm’s ownership structure (i.e. the presence of politically connected blockholders8) influence a 
POE’s decision to engage in cross-border M&A activities. To measure the blockholder effect we 
create two additional variables: the ownership percentage of the largest politically connected 
blockholder (LBH Connection) and a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if more than one 
blockholder is politically connected and 0 otherwise (Multi BH Connections). We consider a 
blockholder to be politically connected if he or she has political ties to the government (as in the 
definition of political connections for top managers) or if the blockholder is the state. We obtain 
information about blockholders’ backgrounds from the Stockstar website. To isolate the effect of 
ownership-level political connections from management-level political connections, we only 
include politically-connected blockholders who are not top managers at the same time.  
                                                             
8 A blockholder holds at least 10% of the voting rights (see, Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist, 2006).  
 18 
A third robustness check determines whether the results are primarily driven by “active” 
acquisitive POEs, i.e. POEs that complete more than one acquisition during our sample period. To 
this end, we employ both panel Poisson regressions and post-matching cross-sectional Poisson 
regressions (and using the same PSM technique as in the logit model). The baseline model follows 
the logic of equation (1), but the dependent variable is now a count variable that measures the 
number of overseas targets acquired by a POE over our sample period: 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏,𝒕 +
+𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                (2) 
4.2. Endogeneity Concerns 
We note that the potentially endogenous nature of political connections may impede the 
robustness of the proposed causal relationship between political connections and the likelihood of 
acquiring overseas targets for Chinese POEs. We conduct a quasi-natural experiment to cope with 
this problem. Specifically, we examine whether chairman/CEO turnovers that result in an increase 
in the PC Index (i.e. that cause firms to be more politically connected) increase the likelihood of 
POEs engaging in cross-border M&A transactions. Our first step is to apply a similar PSM routine 
to that used in our previous analysis. We include the PC Index as an additional matching variable 
and match in the year before the POE completed its first cross-border M&A deal (288 firm-year 
observations) with POEs that did not acquire any overseas companies during the observation period. 
This ensures that acquiring and non-acquiring POEs have “identical” company characteristics just 
before their first cross-border M&A. If political connections facilitate cross-border deal 
completions, we expect that companies replacing their top management with more politically 
connected successors will be more likely to engage in cross-border M&A activities.  
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To measure this effect, we create a dummy variable (Political Turnover) that equals 1 if the CEO 
or chairman is replaced in the five years before the firm completed the first cross-border M&A deal 
with a CEO/chairman with a higher PC Index (stronger political ties), and 0 if there is no turnover 
or a turnover that does not result in a higher PC Index.9 Our model reads as follows: 
𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴(1/0)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙
𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,             (3) 
The variable of interest in equation (3) is the coefficient on Political Turnover (𝛽1). If political 
connections indeed increase the likelihood of a Chinese POE going global, we expect 𝛽1 to be 
positive. We also perform a robustness check in which we replace Political Turnover with a 
variable that indicates the change in the political connections of the blockholders within the five 
years before the firm’s first cross-border M&A (PBH Turnover). 
4.3. The Financial Performance of Chinese POEs after Cross-border M&A Announcements 
We begin our analysis of how the market reacts to cross-border M&A announcements by 
Chinese POEs by using a standard event study approach. Following Du and Boateng (2015), we 
use an event window of (-1, 1) and an estimation period of (-240, -21) relative to the first 
announcement date of an acquisition (𝑡 =  0). The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
are calculated using a one-factor market model (employing the value-weighted Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Composite Index as a market index). For robustness, we also consider the event windows 
(0, 1), (-2, 2), and (-3, 3).  
                                                             
9 First, we retrieve the chairman/CEO turnover information from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms Corporate Governance 
Research Database. Next, we manually check the background information in the top managers’ profiles provided by 
Stockstar to identify whether the turnover is considered political (i.e. whether the PC Index value increases). 
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To examine the link between political connections and the market reaction to cross-border deal 
announcements, we estimate the following multivariate regression:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 ∙ ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑘 ∙
∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘,𝑖𝑘 +  𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,        (4) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring POE 𝑖 during the period starting 
one day before and ending one day after the cross-border deal announcement. The independent 
variables are the same as in equation (1) with the addition of 𝑗 Distance measures, which represents 
differences in the two cultural dimension measures (Hofstede and Culture Distance), and 𝑘 Deal 
Characteristics, which include the target size (Deal Size), the method of payment (All Cash Deal 
and All Stock Deal), the listing status of the target company (Public Target), and the legal system 
of the target’s home country (Common Law). According to our hypothesis, if the politically 
connected top managers of POEs tend to build their political capital at the expense of shareholder 
interests, we expect the coefficients on the political connection variables Connection and PC Index 
(𝛽1) to be negative. 
To complete the picture, we also examine the accounting performance of POEs, measured by 
ROE, after completing a cross-border M&A transaction. However, the decisions to hire politically 
connected top executives and to become active in acquiring foreign companies are likely to be 
made simultaneously in an equilibrium setting. This raises a potential endogeneity concern, which 
ideally would be overcome by finding a suitable instrument. Unfortunately, we were not successful 
in finding or constructing a convincing instrument. Consequently, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as indicating correlation only.  
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We compare the financial performance of (politically connected) acquiring companies during 
the three-year period after completion of the cross-border M&A deal with the performance of non-
acquiring POEs. The model is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝂𝒊,𝒕 ∙ 𝚴𝒊,𝒏,,𝒕 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜋𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,          (5) 
where the dependent variable is the 𝑅𝑂𝐸 of firm 𝑖 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if POE 𝑖 completed a cross-border M&A between years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 3 , and 0 otherwise. 
Multi Acquirer is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 𝑖 acquires more than one overseas target 
starting in year 𝑡 when the second acquisition is completed until the end of the observation period, 
and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in equation (1). Our main coefficient of interest 
is that for the interaction term, 𝛽3 . If politically connected POEs tend to incur moral hazard 
problems by engaging in political empire building, we expect 𝛽3 to be negative and statistically 
significant. In other words, we expect the effect of political connections on firm performance to 
decrease for POEs that have completed a cross-border M&A transaction. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the annual number of Chinese POEs entering the global market via a 
cross-border M&A transaction for the first time between 2007 and 2016. In total, there are 288 
Chinese POEs that complete foreign acquisitions during our sample period. The annual percentage 
of newly acquiring POEs during our sample period increased substantially in 2011 and peaked at 
21.53% in 2015, with sixty-two POEs entering the international market. However, 2016 saw a 
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significant drop in that number, presumably because of the economic slowdown in China during 
that year. Panel B of Table 1 displays the number of cross-border deals completed by Chinese POEs 
and shows that the vast majority (about three-quarters) of POEs completed only one deal, about 18 
percent two deals and only about five percent engaged in more than two acquisitions. 
—Please insert Table 1 about here— 
Table 2 specifies the countries of origin of the target companies acquired by Chinese POEs. The 
targets are geographically spread around the world. However, the majority are from major world 
economies such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Interestingly, most 
POEs in China seem to extend their business to countries that are not politically “close” to the 
Chinese government. This is in contrast to the situation for SOEs which, according to the findings 
of Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet (2012), are more attracted to countries that have closer bilateral 
political relationships with China and/or are natural resources-based. This underlines our earlier 
argument that POEs tend to be market seekers. Their motivations for going global are based on 
technology and strategy, as demonstrated by our sample.  
—Please insert Table 2 about here— 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the company characteristics of non-acquisitive and 
acquisitive POEs (see Table A1 in the appendix for variable definitions). Our sample consists of 
1,494 non-acquisitive POEs (7,975 firm-year observations) and 288 acquisitive POEs (385 firm-
year observations). We note that, in China, only a small percentage of POEs have entered the 
international markets.  
For acquisitive POEs, we can clearly see that a majority of the firms are politically connected 
to the government, regardless of which index is used (i.e. Connection or the PC Index). The mean 
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of Connection (0.405) implies that about 40% of acquisitive POEs have political ties. The 
differences in Connection and the PC Index between non-acquisitive and acquisitive POEs are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, providing univariate support for Hypothesis 1, i.e. that 
politically connected POEs are more likely to complete cross-border M&A deals than unconnected 
POEs. However, we find no univariate evidence that the corporate governance (Gov Index) of 
acquisitive POEs is higher than that of non-acquisitive POEs (Hypothesis 2). We will explore this 
factor further in our multivariate analyses.  
For the control variables, we find that acquisitive POEs are on average more profitable (ROA), 
larger (Size), and have lower growth opportunities (Tobin’s q) than non-acquisitive POEs. In 
addition, we find that non-acquisitive firms have stronger ownership-based political connections, 
measured by the variables LBH Connection and Multi BH Connections. A lower level of state 
ownership may help acquisitive POEs in the sense that they could be perceived as less government 
connected. The correlation matrices in Table 4 show that the pairwise correlations are not greater 
than 0.5. To further unveil any potential multicollinearity issues, we also calculate the Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) in our multivariate regressions. In line with our bivariate correlation 
analysis, multicollinearity does not appear to pose any problems in a multivariate context.   
—Please insert Tables 3 and 4 about here— 
5.2. Political Connections and M&A Engagement by POEs 
To investigate the link between political connections and the probability of becoming acquisitive 
in international markets, we show the results of a fixed-effects panel logit regression in Table 5. 
Our baseline results in column 1 indicate that politically connected POEs are more likely to acquire 
overseas companies. The coefficient of Connection is 1.474 and statistically significant at the 1% 
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level. Column 2 shows the results when measuring political connections via the PC Index, which 
likewise supports Hypothesis 1, i.e. that the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A 
transaction increases with the strength of political connections. However, we do not find any 
statistical support for Hypothesis 2, namely that a firm with sounder corporate governance is more 
likely to complete a cross-border M&A deal. 
—Please insert Table 5 about here— 
Next, to have a one-to-one comparison, we perform cross-sectional logistic regressions based 
on a balanced matched sample of acquisitive and non-acquisitive POEs using the PSM method. 
The results in Table 6 (Panels A and B) indicate that after matching, the firm characteristics of non-
acquisitive POEs are not statistically different from those of acquisitive POEs. Thus, the sample is 
well-balanced.  
Using this balanced sample, the baseline results in column 1 (Table 7) indicate that politically 
connected POEs are more likely to acquire overseas companies. The coefficient of Connection is 
0.472, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The related marginal effect reveals that the 
predicted probability of becoming an acquisitive POE increases from 45.8% by 11.5 percentage 
points (equivalent to a relative increase of 25.1%) when hiring a politically connected top manager. 
Similar results are obtained when measuring political connections via the PC Index (column 2). 
The coefficient of the PC Index is 0.185, also statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, 
the predicted probability of becoming a cross-border bidder is 46.3% when the PC Index is 0. This 
probability increases by 4.6 percentage points (or 9.9%) when the PC Index increases from 0 to 1, 
by 8.8% when the PC Index increases from 1 to 2, and by 7.9% when the PC Index increases from 
2 to 3. Columns 3 and 4 show that comparable results are obtained when only the first cross-border 
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deal of acquisitive POEs is included. In sum, these PSM results provide further support for 
Hypothesis 1, namely that politically connected POEs have a higher likelihood of entering the 
global market through cross-border M&A deals. Furthermore, the results are both statistically and 
economically significant. They are in line with the intuition that the top managers of POEs are 
more likely to follow the government’s call to go global by completing cross-border M&A 
transactions if they have political connections. These POEs are also more likely to be able to 
manage the logistics of these transactions and to get preferential treatment by the government after 
completing a cross-border M&A transaction. This is supported by our sample firms receiving on 
average an 83% percent higher loan volume in the two years after completing a cross-border M&A 
deals than in the two years before (see Figure 1). 
—Please insert Tables 6 and 7 and Figure 1 about here— 
5.3. Corporate Governance and M&A Engagement by POEs 
To investigate the link between corporate governance and a POE’s likelihood of acquiring an 
overseas target, we focus on the coefficient of the governance index (Gov Index). When performing 
post-matching cross-sectional analyses (see Table 7), this coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, at least at the 10%-level, indicating that POEs with higher corporate governance 
standards are more likely to acquire companies outside China (in line with Hypothesis 2). However, 
the Gov Index was not significant in the panel logistic regression setting in Table 5. Thus, we do 
not find robust empirical support for Hypothesis 2. 
To address a potential endogeneity issue associated with the decision to become an acquisitive 
POE, we conduct a quasi-experiment in which we focus on the replacement of a CEO or chairman 
by a successor with stronger political ties than his or her predecessor (i.e. a higher PC Index). We 
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characterize these turnovers using the variable Political Turnover. If political connections result in 
a higher probability of acquiring a company outside China, we expect to find a higher likelihood 
of POEs entering the global markets after a political turnover. To ensure a balanced sample of 
acquisitive and non-acquisitive POEs, we run a similar PSM routine to that used previously, but 
also require the 288 firm-year observations (corresponding to the POEs’ first cross-border deals) 
to have the same PC Index as those in the control group. The diagnostic tests from Table 8 show 
that the PSM successfully balances the sample.  
We again run a logit regression with the dependent variable of becoming an overseas acquisitive 
POE and a set of explanatory variables that include the Political Turnover dummy. The results (see 
Table 9) show that the coefficient of Political Turnover is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the likelihood of a POE proceeding with a cross-border M&A significantly increases 
after a political turnover. This finding provides strong support for Hypothesis 1 and for a causal 
relationship between political connections and cross-border M&A activities by Chinese POEs. 
—Please insert Tables 8 and 9 about here— 
5.4. The Financial Performance of Multinational POEs after Cross-border M&As 
To explore how POEs fare after completing a cross-border acquisition, we first provide 
univariate results for an event study in which we examine the stock returns of acquisitive POEs 
around the announcement of a cross-border M&A deal (see Table 10). We find that shareholders 
react positively to cross-border M&A announcements with statistically significant CAARs between 
1% and 1.9%, depending on the event window. These findings are in line with Du and Boateng 
(2015) who find that shareholders react positively to cross-border M&A deals by Chinese acquirers. 
Over similar event windows, their CAARs range from 0.45% to 0.64%. However, their study pools 
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SOEs and POEs together. Our results suggest that, overall, cross-border M&A announcements by 
POEs generate higher abnormal returns. However, shareholders react differently depending on 
whether the cross-border M&A deal is announced by firms with politically connected or un-
unconnected top management (Panel B). On average, we find that the announcement returns of 
politically connected POEs are 1.6% lower for all cross-border M&A transactions and 1.9% lower 
for the announcement of a first cross-border deal. These univariate findings match what we expect 
under Hypothesis 3, i.e. that politically connected top managers are more likely to engage in 
political empire-building behavior, which may not be in line with shareholder interests.   
We complement these univariate findings with a multivariate analysis in which we control for 
deal characteristics as well as cultural differences between China and the country where the target 
company is domiciled (see Table 11). The results are consistent with the univariate analysis above. 
The announcement returns are on average about 1.6% lower for politically connected POEs.10,11  
We interpret this as further support for Hypothesis 3, namely that investors may believe that a 
politically connected top management has other (e.g. political) motives when completing cross-
border M&A transactions instead of focusing purely on shareholder wealth maximization. In 
additional analyses we tested indirectly if the acquisition is related to strategic asset seeking. To do 
                                                             
10 To ensure the robustness of our results, we also examine the CARs for other event windows; the empirical results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. The respective results are available from the authors upon request.  
11 Differences in the cross-border acquisition announcement returns for politically connected and unconnected POEs 
may be driven by differences in the completion probability. All of our announcements resulted in completed deals, but 
this is clearly unknown ex ante. We check CSMAR’s Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database 
for failed cross-border M&A deals to determine the difference in deal completion probability between the two cases 
(i.e. when top management is and is not politically connected). We find that deal failure is quite uncommon for POEs 
and occurred only twelve times during our observation period. Among these twelve POEs, five had politically 
connected top managers. Given that there are comparatively few deal failures relative to the number of completed 
deals, it seems unlikely that market participants would assume a high probability of deal failure. However, even if they 
do price it in, the probability of failure among politically connected and non-connected POEs is almost evenly 
distributed. Therefore, market participants would be unable to infer any information about the probability of deal 
failure from knowledge of the political connectedness of top management. 
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so, we compared the difference in Research Intensity between POEs that have completed a cross-
border M&A and propensity-score-matched “control” firms that are not active in the acquisition 
market (see Proelss et al., 2017). We find that the average two-year Research Intensity of 
acquisitive POEs after deal completion is 1.3 percentage points higher than that of control firms 
(p-value = 0.008). We interpret this as evidence that POEs that gain access to “cutting-edge 
technology” through cross-border acquisitions need to increase their R&D spending to successfully 
employ that technology in China (see Wu, 2015). 
The only deal characteristic that is statistically significantly related to the observed 
announcement returns is a deal payment by cash only (All Cash Deal). This positive relationship 
is well documented in the literature (see Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Brown and Ryngaert, 1991; 
Martin, 1996; and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).  
—Please insert Tables 10 and 11 about here— 
To examine a POE’s financial performance during the three-year period after it has completed 
a cross-border deal, we calculate the return on equity (ROE) for acquisitive and non-acquisitive 
POEs. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 . The 
coefficients of Connection and the interaction term (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) are 0.054 and -
0.198, respectively, and are both statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 12). This 
indicates an underperformance of about 14 percentage points (0.054 - 0.198), measured by ROE, 
of politically connected POEs relative to non-connected POEs during the three-year period after 
completing a cross-border M&A deal. Notwithstanding the potential endogeneity concern, this 
result is consistent with our political connection trade-off theory (and Hypothesis 3), under which 
politically connected top managers complete cross-border M&A deals largely as a means of 
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political empire building. This may occur at the expense of shareholder value, and may thus be 
associated with a decrease in the POE’s firm value. The coefficient of 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 is positive and 
significant at the 5%-level, which is consistent with our univariate evidence showing that, on 
average, investors react positively to cross-border M&A announcements. We also find that serial 
acquirers have statistically significantly higher accounting performance than one-time acquirers 
after completing a cross-border M&A deal, which could be explained by learning gains through 
serial acquisitions (cf., Aktas, Bodt and Roll, 2013). 
—Please insert Table 12 about here— 
5.5. Robustness Checks 
Our first set of robustness checks focuses on an alternative explanation for the importance of 
political connections, namely that ownership-level political connections matter more than those of 
the top management. To rule out this alternative explanation, we re-estimate the previous panel 
logistic regressions, the cross-sectional logit regressions, and the quasi-experiment while also 
including two ownership-level political connection variables (LBH Connection and Multi BH 
Connections). The results show that neither LBH Connection nor Multi BH Connections is 
statistically significantly positively related to the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A 
deal (see Table A2 in the appendix). Moreover, the coefficients for the top management political 
connection variables (Connection and PC Index) do not change substantially and remain 
statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Similarly, when we re-perform our quasi-experiment 
(see Table A3 in the appendix), we find that the replacement of a blockholder by a new blockholder 
with stronger ties is unrelated to the probability of completing a cross-border M&A transaction, 
unlike a political turnover of the top management (see Table 9). In sum, we find no evidence that 
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ownership-based political connections increase the likelihood of a POE becoming acquisitive in 
foreign markets, while the political connections of top management continue to produce similar 
effects.  
Furthermore, to address the potential influence of clustered or serial acquisitions by POEs, we 
checked for robustness by using a count model (i.e. panel and cross-sectional Poisson regressions) 
in which the dependent variable is the number of overseas targets acquired by POEs (see Table A4 
in the appendix). Some of these model specifications also control for ownership-level political 
connections. We find that political connections (measured by Connection and the PC Index) are 
statistically significantly positively related to the number of completed cross-border M&A deals 
whereas ownership-level political connections show no association. Therefore, we do not find any 
evidence that the main results are driven by clustered or serial acquisitions. 
Finally, we test for a potential interaction between political connections and a POE’s corporate 
governance. Such an interaction might be expected if politically connected top managers tend to 
pursue cross-border M&A deals for reasons other than maximizing shareholder value, such as 
maximizing political capital. In this context, we conjecture that higher corporate governance 
standards within a company limit top management’s propensity for political empire building at the 
cost of shareholder value. For example, we expect the interaction term (Connection x Gov Index) 
to have a positive coefficient in a regression of POEs’ financial performance after a cross-border 
M&A. In unreported results, we include this interaction term in all previous analyses and find that 
is has no statistical significance, regardless of the dependent variable in question (e.g. the likelihood 
of a cross-border M&A or stock prices following cross-border M&A announcements). One possible 
explanation is provided by Claessens and Fan (2002) who argue that corporate governance 
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mechanisms have very limited effectiveness in systems with weak institutions. The arguably weak 
institutional environment in China seems to carry more weight than a sound corporate governance 
system; thus, the latter is neither able to block (value destroying) cross-border M&A deals nor deter 
politically connected top managers from prioritizing their political capital over shareholder 
interests.  
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the factors that affect the likelihood and consequences (in terms of firm 
performance) of cross-border M&A transactions by Chinese POEs. Using a sample of 1,782 
privately owned and publicly listed firms in China over the 2007-2016 period, we find strong 
empirical evidence that politically connected POEs have a greater chance of expanding their 
operations internationally through cross-border M&A activities than POEs without such 
connections. This is in line with the first part of our political connection trade-off theory, namely 
that politically connected top managers are more motivated to carry out cross-border M&A deals 
than their unconnected counterparts and are in a better position to handle the logistics. Our results 
hold after accounting for the potentially endogenous relationship between political connections and 
Chinese POEs’ global expansion and after controlling for ownership-level political connections. 
However, we find at most weak support for the notion that sounder corporate governance increases 
a POE’s probability of completing a cross border M&A deal. 
Finally, with respect to Chinese POEs’ performance after announcing and completing a cross 
border M&A deal, our results are consistent with the second part of our political connection trade-
off theory. We find that the average announcement returns of cross-border M&A deals are lower 
for POEs in which the top managers are politically connected. We further show that accounting 
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performance (measured by ROE) in the three-year period after deal completion is poorer for 
connected than for unconnected POEs. These findings provide empirical support for the anecdotal 
evidence (reported in the news) that top managers with political connections might be pursuing a 
political agenda and thereby create a moral hazard conflict at the expense of shareholder value.  
Overall, our empirical analysis supports the notion that for emerging markets, the institutional 
environment affects POEs’ decisions to become acquisitive in foreign markets. Specifically, it 
highlights the crucial role played by political connections in China in facilitating POEs’ outbound 
FDI. When operating in an institutional environment that features excessive favoritism toward 
SOEs, building political ties can be an effective way of overcoming market discrimination and 
obtaining state-controlled financial resources. In other words, establishing political connections 
allows Chinese POEs to receive preferential treatment from the Chinese government in completing 
the financial and bureaucratic activities necessary for successful cross-border M&A (for example, 
obtaining credit from state-owned banks, obtaining tax rebates, and simplifying the tedious and 
complex “going global” approval process). However, this may come at the cost of politically 
connected top managers overweighing their objective to create political capital while ignoring 
shareholder interests. In sum, the outcomes of this study are as expected under the political 
connection trade-off theory.  
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Figure 1: Bank Loan Volume of POEs before and after Cross-border M&A Transactions 
This figure shows the mean bank loan volume (in million Chinese Yuan) POEs receive before and after the completion 
of a cross-border merger or acquisition (CBMA), based on 203 observations for which bank loan data are available in 
CSMAR’s Bank Loan Research Database. 
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Table 1: Overview of Cross-border M&A Transactions by Chinese POEs  
Panel A of this table reports the number of Chinese POEs completing a cross-border M&A transaction for the first 
time by year, along with percentages, between 2007 and 2016. Chinese POE data are retrieved from the CSMAR 
database. Panel B shows the distribution of the number of completed cross-border M&A transactions for acquiring 
POEs.  
 
Panel A: 
 
Year Number of Acquiring POEs Percentage (%) 
2007 12 4.17 
2008 12 4.17 
2009 13 4.51 
2010 22 7.64 
2011 32 11.11 
2012 42 14.58 
2013 32 11.11 
2014 28 9.72 
2015 62 21.53 
2016  33 11.46 
Total  288 100.00 
 
Panel B: 
 
Number of Completed 
Cross-border M&A Deals 
Number of POEs Percentage (%) 
1 219 76.04 
2 52 18.06 
3 10 3.47 
4 5 1.74 
5 1 0.35 
7 1 0.35 
Total 288 100.00 
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Table 2: Locations of the Targets Acquired by POEs 
Distribution of target countries for Chinese POEs operating as acquiring POEs between 2007 and 2016.  
 
Country of Acquired Target(s) Number  
Argentina 2 
Australia 25 
Belgium 1 
Brunei 2 
Bulgaria 1 
Cambodia 1 
Canada 14 
Cyprus 1 
Czech Republic 1 
Denmark 4 
France 7 
Germany 45 
India 1 
Indonesia 4 
Israel 1 
Italy 14 
Japan 39 
Kazakhstan 4 
Liechtenstein 1 
Luxembourg 3 
Malaysia 9 
Mongolia 1 
Netherlands 13 
New Zealand 1 
North Korea 1 
Norway 1 
Pakistan 1 
Poland 1 
Portugal 2 
Singapore 30 
South Africa 1 
South Korea 24 
Spain 2 
Sweden 3 
Switzerland 6 
Thailand 1 
United Kingdom 22 
United States 92 
Uruguay 2 
Vietnam 1 
Total  385 
  
 42 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for all POEs 
This table reports summary statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 25% and 75% quantiles, and the number of 
firm-year observations, N) for all sample variables for non-acquiring POEs (Panel A) and acquiring POEs (Panel B) 
between 2007 and 2016. All variable definitions are as in Panel A of Table A1 in the appendix. Panel C reports the 
pairwise differences in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) of the variables between acquiring and non-
acquiring POEs. Related p-values are shown to the right in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% N 
Panel A: Non-acquiring POEs 
Connection 0.291 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.000 7,975 
PC Index 0.633 0.000 1.050 0.000 1.000 7,975 
LBH Connection 0.025 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 7,975 
Multi BH Connections 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 7,975 
Gov Index 3.337 3.000 1.213 3.000 4.000 7,975 
ROA 0.044 0.043 0.052 0.017 0.072 7,975 
Leverage 0.392 0.379 0.207 0.221 0.547 7,975 
Firm Size 21.345 21.235 0.915 20.679 21.911 7,975 
Tobin’s q 2.941 2.383 1.729 1.693 3.697 7,975 
Tangibility 0.204 0.179 0.142 0.094 0.290 7,975 
Panel B: Acquiring POEs 
Connection 0.405 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 385 
PC Index 0.901 0.000 1.164 0.000 2.000 385 
LBH Connection 0.017 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 385 
Multi BH Connections 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 385 
Gov Index 3.397 3.000 1.182 3.000 4.000 385 
ROA 0.056 0.051 0.055 0.026 0.081 385 
Leverage 0.390 0.399 0.206 0.215 0.540 385 
Firm Size 21.770 21.629 1.065 21.045 22.415 385 
Tobin’s q 2.879 2.284 2.360 1.616 3.251 385 
Tangibility 0.208 0.182 0.142 0.094 0.306 385 
Panel C: Differences Differences in Means Differences in Medians   
Connection -0.1114*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)   
PC Index -0.268*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)   
LBH Connection 0.009* (0.064) 0.000*** (0.006)   
Multi BH Connections 0.009* (0.091) 0.000* (0.091)   
Gov Index -0.060 (0.343) 0.000 (0.239)   
ROA -0.011*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000)   
Leverage 0.003 (0.816) -0.020 (0.902)   
Firm Size -0.425*** (0.000) -0.394*** (0.000)   
Tobin’s q 0.062 (0.498) 0.099** (0.024)   
Tangibility -0.004 (0.570) -0.003 (0.552)   
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Table 4: Correlation Matrices 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between our sample variables for all POEs (Panel A) and for our subset of acquiring POEs (Panel B) between 2007 and 
2016. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) CBMA 1.000           
(2) Connection 0.052*** 1.000          
(3) PC Index 0.053*** 0.938*** 1.000         
(4) LBH Connection -0.020 -0.056*** -0.073*** 1.000        
(5) Multi BH Connections -0.018 0.018 -0.006 0.317*** 1.000       
(6) Gov Index 0.010 -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.022* 0.003 1.000      
(7) ROA 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.060*** -0.058*** -0.006 0.001 1.000     
(8) Leverage -0.003 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.155*** 0.060*** -0.035** -0.355*** 1.000    
(9) Firm Size 0.096*** 0.154*** 0.145*** 0.038*** 0.033** -0.046*** 0.058*** 0.396*** 1.000   
(10) Tobin’s q -0.007 -0.076*** -0.066*** -0.051*** -0.031** 0.063*** 0.250*** -0.299*** -0.335*** 1.000  
(11) Tangibility 0.006 0.030** 0.007 0.103*** 0.021 -0.068*** -0.171*** 0.110*** -0.039*** -0.125*** 1.000 
 
Panel B: 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) CAR 1.00                 
(2) Connection -0.13 1.00                
(3) PC Index -0.13 0.94*** 1.00               
(4) Gov Index -0.02 0.02 0.08 1.00              
(5) Hofstede 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 0.04 1.000             
(6) Culture Distance -0.02 0.07 0.14* 0.01 -0.48*** 1.00            
(7) Multi Acquirer 0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.15* 0.10 -0.11 1.00           
(8) Deal Size 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.06 1.00          
(9) Public Target -0.080 0.14* 0.11 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.03 1.00         
(10) All_Cash Deal 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 1.00        
(11) All Stock Deal -0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 0.14* 0.09 -0.01 -0.71*** 1.00       
(12) Common Law -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 0.07 -0.43*** 0.50*** -0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.07 1.00      
(13) ROA 0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 1.00     
(14) Leverage 0.00 0.19** 0.14* -0.05 0.07 -0.08 0.17* 0.13 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.07 -0.36*** 1.00    
(15) Firm Size 0.03 0.23*** 0.20** -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.09 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 -0.18* 0.54*** 1.00   
(16) Tobin’s q 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.10 -0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.41*** -0.39*** -0.29*** 1.00  
(17) Tangibility -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 0.19** 0.02 -0.10 1.00 
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Table 5: The Effect of Political Influence on Becoming Acquisitive  
Results of a panel logit regression analysis for Chinese acquiring and non- acquiring POEs between 2007 
and 2016. Chinese acquiring POEs are defined as those with at least one cross-border M&A transaction 
within the sample period. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the POE completes 
a cross-border M&A deal in a given year, and 0 otherwise. See equation (1) for details. Column (1) 
reports the results using Connection as a proxy for political connections; column (2) uses the PC Index 
as a measure for political connections. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions. In the last two rows, we report the 
maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Connection 1.474***  
 (0.000)  
PC Index  0.557*** 
  (0.008) 
Gov Index 0.029 0.027 
 (0.624) (0.651) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 9,946 9,946 
Max VIF 1.46 1.46 
Mean VIF 1.22 1.22 
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Table 6: Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports the results of a propensity score matching (PSM) routine for acquiring and non- 
acquiring Chinese POEs from 2007 to 2016. We match firms using a nearest neighbor propensity score 
matching algorithm and an array of firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, 
Tangibility) in the year the POE completes its cross-border deal. Panel A reports the univariate balanced 
test results for pairs of treatment and control firms after matching. Panel B reports parameter estimates 
for the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores of the treated and control groups (where the 
treatment is a cross-border acquisition). We match firms in the year before completing a cross-border 
M&A deal with non-acquiring POEs. The “Pre-Match” column contains the parameter estimates of the 
probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These estimates are then used to generate the 
propensity scores for matching acquiring and non-acquiring POEs. The “Post-Match” column contains 
the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the subsample of matched treatment-control 
pairs after matching. We match firms using a one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching, 
without replacement. Definitions for all variables are provided in Panel A of Table A1 in the appendix. 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions in Panel B. We report coefficient 
estimates with p-values in parentheses below. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Control Treatment Diff. p-value 
ROA 0.059 0.056 0.003 0.407 
Leverage 0.393 0.390 0.003 0.839 
Firm Size 21.799 21.770 0.029 0.697 
Tobin’s q 3.028 2.879 0.149 0.332 
Tangibility 0.205 0.208 -0.003 0.790 
  
Panel B Pre-Match Post-Match 
ROA 0.783 -0.545 
 (0.170) (0.592) 
Leverage -0.356** -0.027 
 (0.030) (0.929) 
Firm Size 0.303*** -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.711) 
Tobin’s q 0.033* -0.022 
 (0.059) (0.417) 
Tangibility 0.234 -0.025 
 (0.244) (0.947) 
Constant -8.125*** 0.583 
 (0.000) (0.649) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,360 770 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.007 
P-value of χ2 <0.001 1.000 
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Table 7: The Effect of Political Influence on Becoming Acquisitive—A Cross-
sectional Analysis 
This table reports the results of a post-matching logit regression analysis for Chinese acquiring and non-
acquiring POEs between 2007 and 2016. Acquiring POEs are defined as those with at least one cross-
border M&A transaction within the sample period. Non-acquiring companies are the one-to-one nearest 
neighbors as defined in Table 6. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the POE 
completes a cross-border M&A deal in a given year, and 0 otherwise. See equation (1) for details. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the post-matching results using all cross-border deals; columns (3) and (4) 
report the post-matching results considering only the first cross-border deals for each acquiring POE. We 
report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using the 
clustered standard errors at the firm level for Columns (1) and (2). p-values are based on robust standard 
errors for columns (3) and (4). Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in all regressions. In the last 
two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connection 0.472**  0.432**  
 (0.016)  (0.021)  
PC Index  0.185**  0.188** 
  (0.026)  (0.018) 
Gov Index 0.125* 0.121* 0.144** 0.142* 
 (0.067) (0.075) (0.048) (0.051) 
Constant 0.946 0.942 -0.508 -0.457 
 (0.696) (0.698) (0.840) (0.855) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 770 770 576 576 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.017 0.032 0.032 
Max VIF 1.61 1.61 1.56 1.56 
Mean VIF 1.27 1.27 1.24 1.24 
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Table 8: Propensity Score Matching—A Quasi Experiment 
This table reports the result of propensity score matching (PSM) for Chinese acquiring and non-acquiring 
POEs from 2007 to 2016. We match firms using a nearest neighbor propensity score matching algorithm 
and an array of firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, Tangibility) plus the 
PC Index in the year before the acquiring POE completes its first cross-border merger. Panel A reports 
the univariate balanced test results for pairs of treatment and control firms after matching. Panel B reports 
parameter estimates for the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores of the treated and 
control groups (where the treatment is a cross-border M&A). We match firms in the year before 
completing a cross-border M&A transaction with non-acquiring POEs. The “Pre-Match” column 
contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These 
estimates are then used to generate the propensity scores for matching acquiring and non-acquiring POEs. 
The “Post-Match” column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the 
subsample of matched treatment-control pairs after matching. We match firms using a one-to-one nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching, without replacement. Definitions for all variables are provided in 
Panel A of Table A1 in the appendix. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions in 
Panel B. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Control Treatment Diff. p-value 
PC Index 0.889 0.872 0.017 0.860 
ROA 0.057 0.058 -0.001 0.858 
Leverage 0.374 0.374 0.000 0.983 
Firm Size 21.601 21.601 0.000 0.995 
Tobin’s q 2.791 2.958 -0.167 0.346 
Tangibility 0.210 0.205 0.005 0.674 
  
Panel B Pre-Match Post-Match 
PC Index 0.067*** 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.943) 
ROA 1.087* -0.104 
 (0.086) (0.929) 
Leverage -0.338* 0.082 
 (0.062) (0.822) 
Firm Size 0.197*** -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.907) 
Tobin’s q 0.028 0.012 
 (0.137) (0.711) 
Tangibility 0.167 -0.017 
 (0.449) (0.970) 
Constant -5.895*** 0.081 
 (0.000) (0.574) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,141 576 
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.020 
P-value of χ2 <0.001 0.967 
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Table 9: The Effect of Political Influence on Becoming Acquisitive—A Quasi 
Experiment 
This table reports the results of a logit regression analysis for acquiring and non-acquiring Chinese POEs 
between 2007 and 2016 after a top management turnover. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the POE completes a cross-border M&A transaction three years after the top management 
turnover, and 0 otherwise. Chinese non-acquiring companies are the one-to-one nearest neighbors from 
Table 8. See equation (3) for details. We report coefficient estimates and p-values that are calculated 
using robust standard errors. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions. In the last 
two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Political Turnover 1.059** 
 (0.029) 
Connection  -0.111 
 (0.552) 
Gov Index 0.082 
 (0.265) 
Constant -0.731 
 (0.778) 
Firm Characteristics Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 576 
Pseudo R2 0.030 
Max VIF 1.54 
Mean VIF 1.23 
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Table 10: Announcement Returns of Cross-border M&A Announcements by 
Chinese POEs 
Panel A of this table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around the announcement 
date of a cross-border M&A transaction by a Chinese POE for the event windows (-1, 1), (0, 1), (-2, 2), 
and (-3, 3). The CAARs are calculated using a one-factor market model (employing the value-weighted 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index as the market factor). The estimation period spans from 240 to 
21 days before the announcement date (see, Du and Boateng, 2015). t-statistics and p-values are 
calculated using robust standard errors. Panel B shows the average difference in the cumulative abnormal 
returns for the event window (-1, 1) between politically connected and non-connected POEs. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
All Cross-border M&A Difference in Means 
Connected – Non-Connected -0.016** (0.014) 
Observations 226  
   
First Cross-border M&A Only Difference in Means 
Connected – Non-Connected -0.019** (0.012) 
Observations 176  
 
  
Event Window CAAR  t-statistic p-value 
(-1, 1) 0.012*** 3.760 0.000 
(0, 1) 0.010*** 3.560 0.000 
(-2, 2) 0.016*** 4.150 0.000 
(-3, 3) 0.019*** 3.780 0.000 
Observations 226   
 50 
Table 11: Announcement Returns Around Cross-border M&A Announcements 
This table reports the results for OLS regressions of market reactions (i.e. the stock price returns of 
acquiring Chinese POEs) in response to cross-border M&A announcements (see equation (4)). The 
dependent variable is the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) calculated using a one-factor market 
model (employing the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index as the market factor) 
over the event window (-1, 1). Specification (1) includes Connection and all control variables and 
specification (2) includes PC Index and all control variables; both models are for all cross-border M&A 
announcements. Specifications (1)’ and (2)’ are based on subsamples of the data and include only the 
CAR of the first cross-border M&A announcement for each POE. Therefore, the variable Multi Acquirer 
is not included in the model. The variable All Stock Deal is also not included, because there was no 
cross-border M&A transaction that was financed only with stocks within the subsample for first cross-
border M&A announcement for each POE. Therefore, the variable Multi Acquirer is not included in the 
model. The variable All Stock Deal is also excluded, because none of the cross-border M&A transactions 
within the first-transaction subsamples were financed purely with stocks. All variables are defined in 
Table A1 in the appendix. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values 
are calculated using robust standard errors at the firm level. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included 
in all regressions. In the last two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (1)’ (2)’ 
Connection -0.016**  -0.016*  
 (0.017)  (0.054)  
PC Index  -0.007**  -0.007** 
  (0.029)  (0.045) 
Gov Index -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.892) (0.973) (0.335) (0.352) 
Culture Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.608) (0.534) (0.607) (0.547) 
Hofstede -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.871) (0.893) (0.272) (0.271) 
Multi Acquirer 0.006 0.006 - - 
 (0.443) (0.496)   
Deal Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.727) (0.663) (0.655) (0.596) 
Public Target -0.014 -0.016 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.230) (0.145) (0.817) (0.741) 
All Cash Deal 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.032* 0.036** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.076) (0.036) 
All Stock Deal -0.013 -0.012 - - 
 (0.548) (0.582)   
Common Law -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.118) (0.126) (0.167) (0.171) 
Constant 0.078 0.069 0.125 0.119 
 (0.388) (0.439) (0.228) (0.242) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 226 226 176 176 
R2 0.183 0.182 0.222 0.226 
Max VIF 2.14 2.14 2.14 2.01 
Mean VIF 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.36 
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Table 12: The Financial Performance of POEs after Cross-border M&A 
Transactions 
This table shows the effect of political connections on financial performance (as measured by ROE) and 
demonstrates how this relationship is affected by a cross-border M&A within the three years after deal 
completion. The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE) of Chinese POEs. See equation (5) for 
details. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects are included in the regression. In the last two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance 
inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 （1） 
Connection 0.054*** 
 (0.000) 
Post CBMA 0.075** 
 (0.031) 
Post CBMA × Connection -0.198*** 
 (0.000) 
Gov Index -0.005 
 (0.340) 
Multi Acquirer 0.164*** 
 (0.005) 
Constant -1.381*** 
 (0.000) 
Firm Characteristics Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 9,946 
Adjusted R2 0.066 
Max VIF 1.68 
Mean VIF 1.30 
 1 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Independent Variables 
 
(continued) 
  
Variable Definition Source 
CBMA  Dummy variable that equals 1 when a POE is an 
acquiring POE and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the dummy 
variable equals 1 if a given POE conducts a cross-border 
M&A in a given year, and 0 otherwise.  
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database  
Connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman or CEO is 
currently working or has worked in a central or local 
government department, the military, the People's 
Congress (PC), the People’s Court and Procuratorate, or 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), and 0 otherwise. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
PC Index Political connection measure that equals 3 if the 
politically connected chairman or CEO is the head of a 
government department or the head or a standing member 
of the PC or CPPCC, 2 if (s)he is a member of the PC or 
CPPCC, 1 if (s)he is an officer of a local government 
department or a military officer, and 0 otherwise. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
LBH 
Connection 
Percentage of ownership for the largest politically-
connected blockholder in a POE, if said ownership is at 
least 10%. The blockholder is considered to be politically 
connected if (s)he is currently working (or has worked) in 
a central or local government department, the military, the 
People’s Congress (PC), the People’s Court and 
Procuratorate, or the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The blockholder is 
also considered politically connected if it is a state entity. 
In addition, this blockholder cannot be the chairman/CEO 
at the same time. Otherwise, the variable is 0.  
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Corporate Governance Research 
Database 
Multi BH 
Connections 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than one 
blockholder is politically connected and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, these blockholders cannot be the chairman/CEO 
at the same time. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Corporate Governance Research 
Database 
ROA Net income over the value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
ROE Net income over the book value of total shareholders’ 
equity. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Leverage Book value of total liabilities over the book value of total 
assets. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Firm Size Logarithm of the book value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tobin’s q Sum of the market value of equity and the book value of 
debt over the sum of the book value of equity and the 
book value of debt. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tangibility Net fixed assets over the value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
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Table A1: Variable Definitions—continued  
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
CAAR Cumulative Average Abnormal Return calculated using a 
one-factor market model (the return on the value-
weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index) over 
the event window (-1, 1) 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Trading Database 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return calculated using a one-
factor market model (the return on the value-weighted 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index) over the event 
window (-1, 1) 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Trading Database 
Hofstede Bilateral difference in the sum of Hofstede’s six-
dimensional national culture index between China and the 
country in which the target firm is located.  
Hofstede (1980) 
https://geert-hofstede.com/ 
Culture 
Distance 
CEPII’s distances measure: Bilateral distances weighted 
by the share of the city’s population in the overall 
country’s population between the biggest city of China 
and the biggest city of the country in which the target 
firm is located 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_m
odele/presentation.asp?id=6 
Multi 
Acquirer 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if an acquiring POE 
completes more than one cross-border M&A, and 0 
otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
Deal Size Logarithm of the appraised value of the target firm. CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
Public Target Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is a public 
listed company, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
All Cash Deal Dummy variable that equals 1 if the cross-border M&A is 
paid with cash only, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
All Stock 
Deal 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the cross-border M&A is 
paid with stock only, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
Common 
Law 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is located 
in a country that applies common law, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
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Table A1: Variable Definitions—continued 
Panel B: The Corporate Governance Index 
The Corporate Governance Index is constructed as in Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016) and reflects 
the sum of the nine governance mechanisms described below. 
 
Gov Indexi,t = ∑ 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐌𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐦𝟗𝐣=𝟏 j 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Definition Measurement and Supporting Literature 
Chairman age Age of the company’s chairman Equals 1 if the age of the chairman of firm i in fiscal 
year t is less than the mean value of the sample in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Waelchli and Zeller, 
2013; Jiang and Kim, 2015).15 
Chairman tenure Number of years the company’s 
chairman has been in office 
Equals 1 if the tenure of the chairman of firm i in 
fiscal year t is less than the mean value of the sample 
in fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack, 1997; Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
Board size Number of directors on the board 
of directors 
Equals 1 if the board size of firm i in fiscal year t is 
less than the mean value of the sample in fiscal year 
t, and 0 otherwise (Yermack, 1996; Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
Board independence Number of independent directors 
on the board of directors 
 
Equals 1 if the number of independent directors on 
the board of firm i in fiscal year t is greater than the 
mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, and 0 
otherwise (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Kim, 
Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, and Nofsinger, 2007). 
Board meeting Number of annual meetings of 
the board of directors 
Equals 1 if the number of annual meetings of the 
board of directors of firm i in fiscal year t is less than 
the mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, and 0 
otherwise (Vafeas, 1999; Yi, Yu, and Jiang, 2011). 
Supervisory board 
size 
Number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board 
Equals 1 if the number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board of firm i in fiscal year t is greater 
than the mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, 
and 0 otherwise (Firth et al., 2007; Ding et al., 2010; 
Jia et al., 2009). 
Ownership 
concentration 
Percentage of shares held by the 
company’s largest shareholder 
Equals 1 if the percentage of shares held by the 
company’s largest shareholder of firm i in fiscal year 
t is greater than the mean value of the sample in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Stiglitz, 1985; Rediker 
and Seth, 1995; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and 
Walker, 2010; Huang et al., 2011). 
Foreign auditor Hiring of a foreign auditor Equals 1 if firm i hires a foreign auditor in fiscal year 
t, and 0 otherwise (Gao and Kling, 2008; Peng, Wei, 
and Yang, 2011). 
State shares State shares account for at least 
5% of the firm’s total shares  
Equals 0 if the state holds more than 5% of the 
shares in firm i in fiscal year t, and 1 otherwise 
(Bloom et al., 2012; Jiang, Huang, and Kim, 2013). 
                                                             
15 As Jiang and Kim (2015, pp 209) point out, using chairman age and tenure for constructing the 
corporate governance index for Chinese companies is appropriate because “the actual person who is 
actively in charge of the business is not the CEO. It is the board chairperson who actively controls and 
runs the firm. In China, this is common knowledge. However, based on the academic literature, it seems 
that many scholars are unaware of this.” 
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Table A2: The Effect of Blockholders’ Political Connections on Becoming 
Acquisitive 
This table reports the results of a panel logit regression analysis (columns (1) and (2)) and a post-
matching cross-sectional logit regression analysis (columns (3) and (4)) for all cross-border acquiring 
and non-acquiring POEs between 2007 and 2016. Columns (5) and (6) repeat the post-matching cross 
sectional analyses, but only consider the first cross-border deal for each acquisitive POE. Acquiring 
POEs are defined as those with at least one cross-border M&A transaction within the sample period. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the POE completes a cross-border M&A deal in 
a given year, and 0 otherwise. See equation (1) for details. To measure the political connections of 
blockholders, we employ the variables LBH Connection (the percentage ownership of the largest 
politically-connected blockholder) and Multi BH Connections (a dummy variable indicating whether a 
firm has multiple politically-connected blockholders). We report coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses below. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in all regressions. In the last two rows, 
we report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Connection 1.331***  0.466**  0.395**  
 (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.037)  
PC Index  0.488***  0.179**  0.173** 
  (0.000)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
LBH Connection -4.724** -4.555** -0.059 0.011 -1.104 -1.121 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.964) (0.993) (0.319) (0.315) 
Multi BH Connections -9.735 -8.974 -2.036 -2.017 -1.229 -1.197 
(0.986) (0.982) (0.103) (0.103) (0.306) (0.317) 
Gov Index 0.030 0.028 0.133* 0.129* 0.149** 0.146** 
 (0.605) (0.627) (0.054) (0.060) (0.042) (0.044) 
Constant   0.602 0.577 -0.896 -0.846 
   (0.804) (0.812) (0.725) (0.740) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,946 9,946 770 770 576 576 
Maximum VIF 1.48 1.48 1.63 1.63 1.59 1.59 
Mean VIF 1.20 1.20 1.25 1.25 1.24 1.23 
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Table A3: The Effect of Blockholders’ Political Influence on Becoming 
Acquisitive—A Quasi Experiment 
This table reports the results of a logit regression analysis for acquiring and non- acquiring Chinese POEs 
between 2007 and 2016 after the change in the political connections of the blockholders within the five 
years before the firm’s first cross-border M&A. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the POE completes a cross-border M&A transaction, and 0 otherwise. Non-acquiring companies are 
identified via a one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching algorithm. To measure the 
political connections of blockholders, we employ the variables LBH Connection (the percentage of the 
largest politically-connected blockholder) and Multi BH Connections (a dummy variable indicating 
whether a firm has multiple politically-connected blockholders). We report coefficient estimates with p-
values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using robust standard errors. Industry and Year 
Fixed Effects are included in all regressions. In the last two rows, we report the maximum and mean 
variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
PBH Turnover -0.230 
 (0.839) 
LBH Connection -1.167 
 (0.327) 
Multi BH Connections  -1.325 
 (0.269) 
Gov Index 0.148** 
 (0.043) 
Constant -0.904 
 (0.724) 
Firm Characteristics Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Maximum VIF 1.59 
Mean VIF 1.27 
Observations 576 
Pseudo R2 0.031 
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Table A4: Poisson Regression Analysis 
This table reports the results of a panel Poisson regression analysis (columns (1) to (4)) and a post-matching Poisson regression analysis (columns (5) to (8)) for all cross-
border deals. The sample period is between 2007 and 2016. Chinese acquiring POEs are defined as those with at least one cross-border M&A transaction within the sample 
period. The dependent variable is a count variable indicating the number of overseas targets acquired by Chinese POEs. See equation (2) for details. Columns (1) to (2) 
and (5) to (6) only use Connection or PC Index as the measure for political connections (of the management), while columns (3) to (4) and (7) to (8) also use LBH 
Connection and Multi BH Connections so as to also incorporate measures for political connections of the blockholders. We report incidence-rate ratios (IRR) together with 
p-values in parentheses below. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in all regressions. In the last two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance inflation 
factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Connection 1.511***  1.156***  1.301***  1.305***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
PC Index  1.148**  1.147**  1.115***  1.115*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Gov Index 1.026 1.024 1.025 1.024 0.993 0.993 0.994 0.994 
 (0.542) (0.567) (0.548) (0.573) (0.862) (0.858) (0.877) (0.873) 
LBH Connection   0.318 0.341   0.785 0.832 
   (0.135) (0.159)   (0.685) (0.757) 
Multi BH Connections   0.302 0.300   0.325 0.326 
   (0.284) (0.282)   (0.275) (0.277) 
Constant     0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 770 770 770 770 
Max VIF 1.46 1.46 1.48 1.48 1.61 1.61 1.63 1.63 
Mean VIF 1.22 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.27 1.27 1.25 1.25 
 
